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I Can't Believe I Taped the Whole Thing:
The Case Against VCRs That Zap
Commercials
by
Steven S. Lubliner*
Any attempt to make the radio an advertising medium, m the accepted
sense of the term, would, we think, prove positively offensive to great
numbers of people. The family circle is not a public place, and adver-
tising has no business intruding there unless it is invited.'
Control over one's environment is a precious commodity On any
given day the average person must obey superiors, pay others for goods
and services, tend to the needs of children, and-the unkindest cut of
all-submit to the demands and inexorable decline of the body. When,
however, all seems lost it is comforting to know that one last vestige of
control remains firmly within an individual's grasp--the pause and fast
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1985, University of Califorma, Berkeley.
1. Printer's Ink, Apr. 27, 1922, reprinted in LAURENCE BERGREEN, LOOK Now, PAY
LATER, THE Risa OF NETWORK BROADCASTING 28 (1980). Because Printer's Ink owed its
survival to advertising, its author was concerned about anything that could "react [sic] unfa-
vorably upon advertising in general. It will not do to forget that the public's good-will toward
advertising is an asset of incalculable importance." Id.
The title Look Now, Pay Later is taken from an address given by Edward R. Murrow at a
Radio-Televison News Directors Association meeting m October 1958:
I invite your attention to the television schedules of all networks between the hours
of eight and eleven P.M. Eastern Time. Here you will find only fleeting and spas-
modic reference to the fact that this nation is in mortal danger. [Durng the
daily peak viewing periods, television in the main insulates us from the realities of the
world m which we live. If this state of affairs continues, we may alter an advertising
slogan to read: "Look Now, Pay Later." For surely we shall pay for using this most
powerful instrument of communication to insulate the citizenry from the hard and
demanding realities which must be faced if we are to survive. I mean the word "sur-
vive" literally.
Id. at 249.
forward buttons on the VCR's remote control.2 One cannot avoid death
and taxes, but one can "zap ' 3 commercials.
2. Fred Rogers, producer and star of Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood, testified to this effect in
the landmark case that established a VCR owner's right to. tape programs for subsequent
viewing:
I have always felt that with the advent of all of this new technology that allows
people to tape the "Neighborhood" off-the-air [sic] ... that they then become much
more active in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I am
opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in broadcasting
has always been "[y]ou are an important person just the way you are. You can make
healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long, but I just feel that anything that
allows a person to be more active in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
important.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (quoting Transcript at 2920-
21, Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (No. CV 76-3520-F)).
3. One also can "zip" through commercials. "Zapping" and "zipping"--and occasion-
ally "flipping" and "hopping"--are generally interchangeable terms used in discussing com-
mercial avoidance. As one industry observer stated:
Zapping is a hardware-driven phenomenon. Specifically, the proliferation of two
pieces of equipment brought about zapping as we know it today-the remote control
device and the VCR. Zapping then takes two forms: (1) Channel-hopping, often
with a remote unit, (2) zipping past commercials using the fast-forward function of a
VCR.
Michael Drexler, Some Perspectives on TV Commercial Zapping, TELEvISION/RADIO AGE,
Mar. 30, 1987, at 145. Switching off a VCR in "record" mode during the commercial breaks is
also considered "zapping." See Steven Singer, Controversy Dogs VCR Measurement; Bonus or
Lost Client Dollars, TELEVISIoN/RADIO AGE, Jan. 5, 1987, at 103. The A.C. Nielsen Com-
pany defines "zapping" exclusively as the act of eliminating commercials in a program that is
being recorded on a videocassette recorder. Bill Carter, TV Unfazed By Rise in Zapping, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 8, 1991, at Dl.
The practice of using the remote control to jump between channels during commercials is
humorlessly labelled "channel-switching." Id.
The Drexler definition, cited above, is somewhat novel as it labels "zipping" as a subcat-
egory of "zapping" and not as a discrete form of avoidance. See, eg., Gerard Broussard,
Monday Memo, BROADCASTING, Oct. 23, 1989, at 33 ("It may help to dimensionalize the
problem by looking at some facts concerning each of the following areas: Zipping-Fast for-
warding past commercials within VCR-recording programs. Zapping-Switching channels
during commercial breaks via manual or remote control."); Ron Lawrence, The Battle for
Attention, MARKETING AND MEDIA DECISIONS, Feb. 1989, at 80 ("The burgeoning availabil-
ity and use of VCRs and remote-control devices, coupled with so many more program options,
has enabled the disgruntled viewer to zip and zap at will."); Kate Lewin, Getting Around
Commercial Avoidance, MARKETING & MEDIA DECISIONS, Dec. 1988, at 116-17 ("Most me-
dia professionals agree that television commercials are being zapped .... There is, however,
considerable disagreement about the degree and prevalence of other forms of avoidance-lack
of attentiveness, channel-switching, flipping and 'zipping'.")
Though the weight of authority may be contrary, this Note adopts the approach that the
term zap describes both the practice of fast-forwarding through recorded commercials and of
not recording them in the first place. This usage not only is economical, but also suggests the
extent of a viewer's power as he "zaps" unwanted ads.
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Autonomy, however, is not always pretty. The remote control, a
device designed to simplify our lives, arguably has caused more stress
than it has alleviated.4 For example:
"I click because I'm not satisfied," explains Bob Amato, age 36....
[O]ther "clickers" cite boredom as their No. 1 reason for putting their
thumbs to the button....
A Forest Hills woman... uses the remote control as a "weapon"
to yank her husband's attention from the TV set ....
"We share control,"... "but sometimes she holds on to one re-
mote while I hold on to the other. But what really matters is that
master remote. I never give up the combined controller" ....
Though both... say they watch little TV, "he holds the controls
when we do-in his hand," . . . . "He absolutely controls the TV-
watching situation, and it's a constant battle. If I try to get the con-
trols, he threatens to leave the room."15
In analyzing this phenomenon, one expert was unsparing in his
condemnation: "Remote control is infantilyzing," says Edward Wach-
tel, Professor of Communications at Fordham University. "It main-
tains a level of expectation of the world based on our ability to change
the world at a whim."'6
4. See Denise Flaim, Life's a Switch in the Remote Lane: How to Channel Your Flipping
Habits, or Can You Find Happiness With a Maniac at the Control?, NEwSDAY, July 22, 1990,
TV Plus, at 6.
5. Id. Given this anecdotal evidence, it is not surprising to discover that "every study
has shown that the heaviest zappers are usually men." Carter, supra note 3, at D1. "Zapping"
as used by Carter, refers to the practice of using the remote control to jump from channel to
channel during commercials. For a discussion of the various definitions of zapping, zipping,
and other commercial avoidance techniques, see supra note 3.
6. Flaim, supra note 4 at 6. Not everything that purportedly gratifies a "whim" is sub-
ject to criticism. In this author's opinion, however, there exists a knee-jerk tendency to leave
the regulation of instruments of commerce--such as VCRs-to market forces because they do
not fall into categories of contraband or immoral behavior (e.g., drugs, obscene materials,
prostitution). Freedom of choice, at least in consumer electronics, is viewed as an end in itself
without regard to consequences.
The philosopher Herbert Marcuse criticized this view in his book One Dimensional Man.
He noted that "[flree choice among a wide variety of goods and services does not signify
freedom if these goods and services sustain social controls over a life of toil and fear-that is, if
they sustain alienation." HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN 7-8 (1964). Marcuse
felt such goods and services gratified "false needs," which he defined as "those which are
superimposed upon the individual by particular social interests in his repression.... Most of
the prevailing needs... to behave and consume in accordance with the advertisements...
belong to this category of false needs." Id. at 5.
To some, the desire for automatic commercial avoidance technology may constitute a
grass roots rebellion against the imposition of false needs by advertisers. To this author, how-
ever, the technology only amounts to more of the same: another gadget designed and mar-
keted to solve a "problem" that really did not exist until the "solution" was heralded-a false
need if ever there was one.
In many areas, particularly with respect to sex, drugs, and other "illicit" or "immoral"
substances and practices, modern lawmakers regularly determine which needs should be devel-
oped and satisfied. Implicit in such determinations is the balancing of the perceived harms
against the encroachment on freedom. There is no rational reason why VCRs and, indeed, all
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The ultimate commercial avoidance feature is now available in Ja-
pan. In April 1990 Mitsubishi began marketing a VCR in Japan that
can, with some exceptions, distinguish between the program signal and
the advertising signal.7 The machine stops recording when a commercial
is aired and resumes recording when the program resumes.8 The device's
lure is obvious: no more pausing while recording programs; no more fast
forwarding while playing the programs back-it is control without the
remote control.
In a society where "virtually everyone... who wants a videocassette
recorder already owns one," Mitsubishi's machine sold briskly.9 Not
surprisingly, it also ignited a dramatic response. The Tokyo Broadcast-
ing System, Japan's largest privately owned network, apparently feared
that a loss in advertising revenue would accompany a decline in commer-
cial viewing. The company thus began to mix signals designed to confuse
the machine with its broadcast signals. 10 As of this writing, both sides
are at a standoff-the technological war between increasingly sophisti-
cated avoidance features and increasingly elaborate transmission tech-
niques has not yet been declared."
Such a commercial avoidance feature is not currently available in
the United States, 12 and it is not likely to be available soon.13 Develop-
ment of this innovation apparently would require broadcaster coopera-
other goods, should not be subject to the same process. See infra notes 73-75 and accompany-
ing text for an explicit congressional balancing that was resolved against the consumer.
7. David E. Sanger, VCRs That Delete Ads Stir a Fight in Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,
1990, at Al.
8. The feature is limited to programming broadcast in two languages.
Most televisions sold in Japan receive the audio signal in stereo. For many broad-
casts--especially the evening news and movies made in Western countries-the
stereo signal is split in two. As a result, viewers can tune in the original English
soundtrack of Western movies on one channel, or hear a Japanese translation on the
other.... But commercials are not so broadcast in the two languages, so when they
come on, the transmission frequency changes slightly. The Mitsubishi machine de-
tects that change and suspends recording, resuming when the bilingual broadcast
starts again.
Id. at A18.
9. Id.
10. "'We have t9 consider our sponsors,' said Akitsuna Furuya, the chief spokesman for
Tokyo Broadcasting. 'We think that everything should appear on tape just as we broadcast
it.'" Id.
11. Japanese engineers say Mitsubishi easily could develop more advanced sensors that
could not be confused by the Tokyo Broadcasting System's distorted transmission. Id. at Al.
There is a tension, however, between pleasing viewers and "maintain[ing] harmony in the
close-knit world of Japanese business." Id. This tension is exemplified by Mitsubishi's actions
of not advertising its new VCR through television or radio for fear of being perceived as "going
against the system." Id at A18.
12. The American signal does not contain the two-part signal that results from dual lan-
guage programming in Japan. See id. at A18.
13. See id. at A14.
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tion which may not be forthcoming. 14 But who knows what the future
may hold? Mitsubishi developed its VCR in an effort to combat an in-
difstry-wide ten percent annual sales decline of ordinary VCRs in Ja-
pan.15 In the United States, where seven out of ten households have
VCRs, 16 a similar decline has occurred. 17 Thus, innovations will con-
tinue to be aimed at the U.S. market, targeting both the sophisticate 8
and the simpleton.1 9 Because a VCR with automatic commercial avoid-
14. Blair Newman, an American researcher who made significant contributions in this
area stated that he would not develop a system that automatically deleted commercials be-
cause, inter alia, he did not "want to get the broadcast industry mad." Jamie Beckett, Ken-
tucky Fried, McDonald's in Fast-Food Feud, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 29, 1990, at B5. For a more
detailed examination of Mr. Newman's contributions in the area of automatic commercial
avoidance, see infra note 21.
"Functional music" is an example of commercial deletion that has been attained with
broadcaster cooperation. Subscribers to the broadcast service receive a radio broadcast with
all advertising matter deleted. The subscription service deletes advertisements by transmitting
a signal immediately before and after the broadcast of any advertisement. The signal activates
special equipment installed in the subscribers' receivers. This mechanism cuts off the broad-
cast during the advertisement and after deletion reestablishes the broadcast signal. Functional
Music, Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 813 (1959).
15. Sanger, supra note 7, at AIS.
16. Joann S. Lublin, As VCRs Advance Agencies Fear TV Viewers Will Zap More Ads,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1991, at B3.
17. In 1987, the peak year for VCR sales in the United States, 13.3 million units were
sold. This figure dropped to 12.1 million units in 1989. Steve Warren, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 9,
1990.
18. For example, the four-head Mitsubishi HS-V62, a Super VHS machine with elaborate
editing features, dual flying erase heads, joy-shuttle dials on both the VCR and the remote,
noise-free special effects, and visual searches cost just $1,699 in 1990. Brian Clark, SL Nick's
Picks: VCRs and Laserdiscs to Bring Home for the Holidays, VIDEO MAG., Dec. 1990, at 42.
19. A major concern of the VCR industry is that VCR owners spend only three percent
of their TV viewing time watching programs they have recorded. Lublin, supra note 16, at B3.
These low numbers have been attributed to the consumer perception that programming the
VCR to record is difficult. Id One study has shown that 80% of Americans do not under-
stand how to program their VCR. VCR Literacy Dawns During the Bush Administration, PR
NEWSWIRE, June 14, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. Now, however,
the VCR Plus+, designed by Gemstar Development, enables viewers to record a program by
simply punching in a code number. Lublin, supra note 16, at B3. TV listings throughout the
country have started to publish the program codes. Viewers are buying the VCR Plus+ at a
rate three times faster than the manufacturer initially anticipated. Id. Gemstar expects to sell
three million units by the end of the year, and RCA, General Electric, and Zenith will soon
feature the technology. David N. Berkwitz, VCR Plus+: Dial Mfor the Late Night Movie,
NEWSWEEK, June 10, 1991, at 41. Advertisers, however, fear that the proliferation of the
devices and the attendant increase in programs recorded for later viewing will result in dimin-
ished ad viewership. They believe viewers will fast forward through the ads during playback
or will fail to play back the programs at all. Lublin, supra note 16, at B3.
Some observers are skeptical that the VCR Plus+ will achieve its predicted dominance.
Alex Beam, Fleecing Fleet, THE BOSTON GLOBE, June 17, 1991, at 13. Nevertheless, given
that the advent of the VCR Plus+ has forced VCR manufacturers to develop easier program-
ming solutions, such as better on-screen features, displays, and menus, id., the end result is still
increased home taping and a consequent decrease in commercial viewership.
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ance would be commercially popular,20 such technology would be a wel-
come addition to any manufacturer's catalogue.
This Note proceeds on the assumption that a machine such as the
Mitsubishi VCR will be feasible in the United States.21 It analyzes the
current conflict in Japan between Mitsubishi and the Tokyo Broadcast-
ing System as if it were governed by United States law.22 The emphasis
of this analysis is on discerning relevant policies within the law in addi-
tion to analyzing relevant statutes and cases.
Part I presents a brief summary of recent incursions into other me-
dia and other attempts by advertisers to combat commercial avoidance.
Part II examines the Communications Act of 1934,23 which is the body
of law that traditionally has regulated home entertainment devices. Part
III explores the issue of automatic commercial avoidance under the
20. Viewer antipathy toward television commercials continues to rise. Two-thirds of
1,000 viewers polled in a recent survey said they prefer television without any commercials.
This figure is up from 53% in 1985. Lublin, supra note 16, at B3.
21. In 1989, Metaview Corporation began testing SmarTV, a sophisticated viewing sys-
tem that combined personal computers, VCRs and other forms of high-tech wizardry. The
system could zap through commercials at 30 times the real playing time, and could "easily
have been developed to eliminate commercials entirely." SmarTV & 'Genius VCR" TELEVI-
SION DIG., Jan. 30, 1989, at 15. Unlike the Mitsubishi VCR, SmarTV involved the human
element. A Metaview employee would monitor the programming for the ads' start and stop
times and would transmit the data to the SmarTV computer which would zap the ads at the
appointed times. When the consumer ultimately viewed a program, he would have a seamless
recording. David Churbuck, The Ad Killers, FoRiEs, Feb. 20, 1989, at 76. SmarTV was not
developed to eliminate commercials because the company wanted to preserve viewer freedom,
and "because [the company did not] want to get the broadcast industry mad." Beckett, supra
note 14, at B5. The company also envisioned using the SmarTV system to insert ads designed
for specific viewers. "A doctor may get an ad for a pharmaceutical company, for instance,
while a data-processing executive may see an ad for Wang." Id. Despite its high profile, the
SmarTV project failed to attract investors. In May 1990, Blair Newman, the eccentric genius
who developed SmarTV, committed suicide. Preston Gralla, Online Suicide, PC COMPUTING,
May 1991, at 132.
Automatic commercial avoidance is still, however, the focus of current technological fore-
casts. A recent Harvard Business Review article discusses the Frox machine: "[A] superb
computer system created by Apple and NeXT alumni... a kind of supersmart TV that will
[, among other things,] ... delete television advertisements, [and] program the VCR." George
Gilder, Into the Telecosrm HARv. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 150, 154. The advertising
industry also is anticipating automatic commercial avoidance. A study conducted by advertis-
ing industry giant Backer Spielvogel Bates predicted that "[v]ideocassette recorders with com-
mercial sensors... would probably force agencies to create special poster-like commercials
that would have no audio and would appear in a video window in the corner of the television
screen during regular programming." Kim Foltz, B.S.B. "s Crystal Ball Predicts Some High-
Tech Wizardry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1991, at DlI.
22. A recurrent complaint is that the law consistently fails to keep up with the march of
technology. As previously indicated, advertisers are already preparing for automatic commer-
cial avoidance technology. Thus, rather than being a speculative exercise, a discussion of this
subject is currently important.
23. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-757 (1988).
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Copyright Act of 1976.24 This discussion emphasizes how such technol-
ogy may affect the Supreme Court's holding in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios25 that home taping for subsequent viewing is not a
copyright infringement.26 Part IV explores the issue from the viewer's
standpoint and discusses what rights a viewer has respecting signals that
enter his home.
This Note concludes that automatic commercial avoidance technol-
ogy is not only undesirable and inefficient but also may be contrary to
established American law. Both the Communications Act and the Copy-
right Act contain explicit and implicit policies that favor preserving ex-
isting markets from private (home viewer) interference. These strong
federal policies are not outweighed by any countervailing private liberty
interest in possessing automatic commercial avoidance technology.27
I. The War Against Commercials: Attack and Counterattack
The first paid commercial announcement is considered to have been
broadcast in New York in August 1922 by WEAF, a radio station owned
by AT&T. The sponsor was the Queensborough Corporation, an apart-
ment rental concern. The company paid fifty dollars for ten minutes of
24. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988).
25. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
26. Ia at 456. See also TODD GrrN, INSIDE PRIME TIME 3 (1983).
27. Because this Note concludes that federal regulation is appropriate, possible resolution
of the issue under varying state law claims will not be discussed. For example, a viewer,
thwarted by a broadcaster from using an automatic commercial avoidance mechanism in his
home, might bring a nuisance action seeking damages for the lessening of personal enjoyment,
discomfort, and annoyance. See, e.g., 47 CAL. JUR. 3D Nuisances § 15 (1979). Interesting
questions could arise depending on whether the claimed "annoyance" is defined as the invasion
of the domicile resulting in the deprivation of personal property, or whether it is defined as
being forced to record, and perhaps ultimately view, commercials against one's will. Since the
annoyance "must be a real annoyance physically suffered through the medium of the senses,"
id., being forced to watch commercials technically may qualify. However, the annoyance must
"not be purely imaginary, or arise merely from delicacy of taste or refined fancy." Id. Since
commercials have existed for decades, anyone who brought a nuisance action might appear
overly sensitive. On the other hand, two-thirds of viewers recently surveyed would prefer
commercial-free TV. See Lublin, supra note 16, at B3. Thus, perhaps some day the law may
recognize such invasions as nuisances.
Contract issues also could arise. Most television advertising contracts contain provisions
guaranteeing advertisers a minimum level of viewership. If the network falls below this level,
it must compensate the advertiser with free or "make-good" ads. See Susan Bickelhaupt, Be-
hind the Ratings Brouhaha, BOSTON GLOBE, June 26, 1990, at 53. Advertisers received about
$100 million in free ads for the first three months of 1990. Id Given this arrangement it
certainly would be in the self-interest of any network to broadcast signals that would confuse
an automatic commercial avoidance mechanism. The question remains as to whether the net-
works would be obligated to transmit in this fashion under contract performance doctrines of
"best efforts," "reasonable efforts," or "good faith efforts." These issues demonstrate the need
for consistent federal regulation.
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air time. Apparently, the experiment was a success since the company
decided to pay for more commercials.28
At the dawn of the television age, the network system was not ini-
tially designed to be "commercial" as we think of it today. The Radio
Corporation of America (RCA), the parent of the National Broadcasting
Company (NBC), was heavily involved in the manufacture of transmit-
ting and receiving equipment. RCA began NBC partially as a public
service and partially to encourage the sale of RCA equipment-arguably
a commercial motivation. "The RCA hierarchy professed, at the begin-
ning at any rate, to disdain the vulgarity of commercial messages appear-
ing on local programming around the country. Yet the financial rewards
would, in the end, prove irresistible, even necessary, for the networks to
survive."'29
The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), which was not in the
business of manufacturing and selling communications equipment, first
anticipated this modem attitude: "Programming was merely a means to
an end, since Paley's CBS... was frankly in the business of selling audi-
ences to advertisers.... To him a network could incidentally perform a
service function, but primarily it was a business scheme, a tool of com-
merce, a way to distribute advertisers' messages."' 30 Distributing the
messages, however, is not an end in itself. Viewers must view. The
viewer who leaves the room, converses with his spouse, or simply zones
out during the commercials does not get the message. Advertisers re-
cently have been attempting to combat commercial avoidance in a
number of ways that combine creativity and technology, such as employ-
ing "ear-catching Hollywood-style sophisticated sound technology" 31
and producing commercials using the "quick-cut, visually-involving,
highly syncopated rhythms of MTV and Miami Vice." 32
The advent of the VCR has led to some spectacular research into
innovations designed to combat instances of zapping,33 or fast-forward-
ing through.commercials. These developments include a means of pro-
ducing commercials that are equally comprehensible when viewed while
being fast forwarded 34 and methods of producing spots in which a brand
logo appears clearly only when the tape is fast forwarded. 35 Arguably,
many of the above weapons would be rendered useless by automatic com-
28. BERGREEN, supra note 1, at 27-28.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id. at 8. See also GrrLIN, supra note 26, at 3.
31. Jamie Beckett, Commercials "Go Hollywood" With High-Quality Sound, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 22, 1990, at C3.
32. Drexler, supra note 3, at 145, 148.
33. See supra note 3 for an analysis of "zapping," "zipping," and other commercial
avoidance terminology.
34. Lublin, supra note 16, at B3.
35. Id.
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mercial avoidance technology that would ensure the commercial was not
recorded in the first place.
Given past and present ad industry practices, a VCR with automatic
commercial avoidance technology may win one battle against commer-
cials, but it will not win the war. Arguably, any audience that advertisers
lose from television would be recouped elsewhere, and not necessarily via
traditional advertising media such as radio.36 Advertisements have ap-
peared in Nintendo games, 37 video rentals,38 motion pictures, and televi-
sion programs.3 9 A TV ad service intended to reach people using fitness
machines was recently test marketed at a New York health club. 40
Even if one is indifferent to where the intrusions of advertising oc-
cur, one cannot ignore the economic consequences of such intrusions.
Assume that consumers pay for "free" TV by paying more for the adver-
tised goods and services.41 In this case, the consumer at least receives
something-television programming-in return for the advertising pre-
mium they pay at the market. They get nothing, however, for the pre-
mium they pay for the privilege of viewing commercials on a Stairmaster.
Arguably, such an arrangement could result in a reduction in club mem-
bership fees, with club owners profiting by charging advertisers a fee in
excess of the price reduction. But such a benefit to the member is by no
means built into the existing broadcaster-advertiser-viewer relationship.
Thus, from the viewer's standpoint, the "efficiency" and "give-and-take"
of current television advertising arrangements is quite apparent.
With respect to television, product placement, an economic arrange-
ment whereby sponsors pay filmmakers to have their brands clearly dis-
36. Carter, supra note 3, at Dl. "'I also think you're seeing a lot of this out-of-home
marketing because of zapping.' Ms. Frank said. She cited the growing attempts ... to seize
captive viewers in places like schools, doctors' offices and supermarket checkout counters."
Id.
37. For example, "Pepsi has paid Tradewest, a manufacturer of Nintendo programs, to
show the Pepsi logo twice during game play." Dennis Lynch, The Best, Worst of '89 Software,
CH. TRIB., Dec. 29, 1989, at 41. Almost 25% of television households in the country have a
Nintendo system. Bickelhaupt, supra note 27, at 53.
38. For a discussion of the increasing practice of inserting commercials into video rentals
and the trend toward factoring their presence into the film's initial financing package, see
Michael 1. Rudell, When CommercialsAreAdded to Videocassettes, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 4, 1989, at
3; Cathy Seidner, Coming to a TV Near You: More Ads in Home Videos, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 11,
1989, at 5 [hereinafter Seidner, Coming to a TV Near You]; Cathy Seidner, Focusing on Con-
tractual Aspects of Commercials in Videos, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 18, 1989, at 5.
39. Joanne Lipman, Brand-Name Products Are Popping Up in TV Shows, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 19, 1991, at B1. Even the Weather Channel has created sponsorships that allow an adver-
tiser's logo to appear above its maps for the full length of its programming segments. Ellen
Lubell, Is It an Ad-Or Isn't It?, NEWSDAY, Apr. 29, 1990, TV Plus at 6.
40. Carter, supra note 3, at D1.
41. See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
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played during a film or TV program, 42 may give the viewer full value for
his advertising dollar. This purely economic argument, however, ignores
viewers' concerns about the artistic integrity of contemporary films and
TV programs. Some suggest that product placement is eroding the
boundary between advertising and programming-"which already may
be a 'Sunday school idea that has no standing in reality.' 43 On the
other hand, product placement in television shows may be a logical ex-
tension of William Paley's philosophy that programming only exists to
lure audiences to advertisers.44 One cannot accept such intrusions, how-
ever, without acknowledging that programs saturated with product
placements would render the idea of automatic commercial avoidance
technology cruelly absurd. For the would-be commercial avoider would
come home to a seamless recording of a program saturated with
advertisements.
All things considered, while there is no guarantee that prohibiting
automatic commercial avoidance will keep "virgin" territory unspoiled
by advertising,45 it may be wise to choose the devil we know over the
devil we don't. As the following sections indicate, the law supports, and
indeed may compel, that choice.
TH. The Communications Act of 1934
When radio was in its infancy, "the allocation of frequencies was left
entirely to the private sector and the result was chaos."' 46 Congress
passed the 1934 Communications Act as part of an evolving legislative
attempt to harmonize "the cacaphony of competing voices" 47 by allocat-
ing the scarce broadcast frequencies to the numerous applicants in an
42. For a discussion of the trend of tying product placement arrangements to the ads in
video rentals, see Seidner, Coming to a TV Near You, supra note 38, at 5.
43. Lubell, supra note 39, at 7 (quoting sociologist Todd Gitlin). Interestingly, Gitlin
partially attributes this breakdown to advertising influences "outside of television, including
our eagerness to wear logos on our clothing." Id.
44. For a discussion of the conflicting philosophies of early television pioneers, William
Paley of CBS and David Sarnoff of RCA, see supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
45. One might envision an entire bureaucracy charged with the preservation of precious
ad-free space, patterned after today's land management and wildlife preservation departments.
Ironically, some of the "ad pollution" is being created by the scriptwriters themselves-to the
delight of advertisers-in the spirit of artistic realism.
Brand names frequently appear in CBS's "Murphy Brown," for example; ... "We
said we didn't want to do a plain-wrap show," says Diane English, the show's creator
and executive producer. "In real life there are real products that people use, and
sometimes if it fits in, then we go ahead and do it."
Lipman, supra note 39, at B6.
46. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969).
47. Id. at 376. Increasingly sophisticated commercial avoidance features combatted by
ever more sophisticated transmitting techniques would certainly qualify as "disorderly," even
if not technically "cacophonous."
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orderly, efficient manner. The Act created the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) and charged it with the duty to "[s]tudy new uses for
radio, provide for experimental uses of frequencies, and generally en-
courage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public inter-
est."' 48 In its pursuit of the public interest, the FCC is directed to: keep
abreast of pertinent technological developments; 49 encourage the devel-
opment of new technologies and services, while providing a forum to
challenge such development as contrary to the public interest;50 and pro-
mulgate regulations regarding the interference potential of the new
devices. 51
48. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (g) (1988). It should be noted that television broadcasting is encom-
passed in the Act's definition of radio. See id. § 153(b) (defining radio communication).
49. Id. § 218.
Management of business; inquiries by Commission.
The Commission... shall keep itself informed as to... technical developments
and improvements in wire and radio communication and radio transmission of en-
ergy to the end that the benefits of new inventions and developments may be made
available to the people of the United States.
Id.
50. Id. § 157.
New technologies and services.
(a) It shall be the policy of the United States to encourage the provision of new
technologies and services to the public. Any person or party (other than the Com-
mission) who opposes a new technology or service proposed to be permitted under
this Act shall have the burden to demonstrate that such proposal is inconsistent with
the public interest.
Id (emphasis added). The legislative history states: "The Committee has long encouraged the
FCC to foster the delivery of new services and new technologies to the public in order to
increase competition and promote diversity." H.R. RFP No. 356, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2219, 2221. Congress recognized, however, that com-
petition among private interests must be limited to the degree that "the needs of state and local
public safety agencies will be taken into account when the FCC makes decisions regarding
spectrum allocations." Id. at 20, reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2236.
51. 47 U.S.C. § 302.
Devices which interfere with radio reception.
(a) Regulations.
The Commission may, consistent with the public interest, convenience, and neces-
sity, make reasonable regulations (1) governing the interference potential of devices
... and (2) establishing minimum performance standards for home electronic equip-
ment and systems to reduce their susceptibility to interference from radio frequency
energy....
(b) Restrictions.
No person shall manufacture, import, sell, offer for sale, or ship devices or home
electronic equipment and systems, or use devices, which fail to comply with regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to this section.
Id. (emphasis added).
FCC Regulations classify VCRs as a TV interface device, a subset of unintentional radia-
tors. 47 C.F.R. § 15.3(y) (1990); see also id. § 15.115(b)(3). An unintentional radiator is "[a]
device that intentionally generates radio frequency energy for use within the device, or that
sends radio frequency signals by conduction to associated equipment via connecting wiring,
but which is not intended to emit [radio frequency] energy by radiation or induction." Id.
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In carrying out its mandate, the FCC cannot be completely sympa-
thetic to the ideas of an unrestricted market, unrestricted property own-
ership, or the individual's right to pursue private entertainment.52 For
example, in American Radio Relay League v. FCC, 53 the petitioners, a
nonprofit association of amateur radio operators, challenged FCC regula-
tions that prohibited the manufacture and sale of certain citizens band
radio amplifiers because they excessively interfered with television recep-
tion. The court of appeals upheld the Commission's regulations as a
proper exercise of the FCC's power to "make reasonable regulations gov-
erning the interference potential of devices" and to "encourage the larger
and more effective use of radio in the public interest. ' 54 In so holding,
the court rejected petitioners due process claim that the FCC regulations
unnecessarily infringed on their personal liberty and were therefore "ar-
bitrary, capricious, and unreasonable." 55 An earlier case, Functional
Music v. FCC,56 involved an appeal of an FCC ruling that "functional
music" services 57 did not constitute broadcasting within the meaning of
the Communications Act5s and therefore would be relegated to a subsidi-
ary, and arguably technologically inferior, position in the broadcasting
system.59 The Commission feared that functional music programming,
"which is highly specialized and directly adaptable to subscribers' needs,
was formulated in [the broadcasters'] interest rather than that of the gen-
eral public." 60 To support its position, the Commission cited several
prior decisions which held that certain specialized communications did
not constitute broadcasting, including the transmission of coded horse-
race results,6 1 certain police department transmissions,62 and programs
furnishing spiritual, vocational, and marital advice to specified listen-
ers. 63 The court of appeals reversed the Commission's ruling, holding
§ 15.3(z). The unlicensed use of VCRs is limited by the requirement that they not emit unac-
ceptable levels of interference. Id § 15.5(b).
52. This policy is evident in the Radio Act of 1927, the precursor to the Communications
Act. One sponsor of the Radio Act commented that the Act repudiated "the idea ... that
anyone who will may transmit[, and asserted] in its stead.., the doctrine that the right of the
public to service is superior to the right of any individual." 67 CONG. REc. 5479, quoted in
Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 n.5 (1969).
53. 617 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
54. Id. at 877 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 302(a), (g) (1976)).
55. Id.
56. 274 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
57. For a description of "functional music," see supra note 14.
58. The Communications Act defined broadcasting as "the dissemination of radio com-
munications intended to be received by the public, directly or by the intermediary relay sta-
tions." 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1952).
59. Functional Music, 274 F.2d at 545.
60. Id.
61. In re Bremer Broadcasting Co., 2 F.C.C. 79, 83 (1935).
62. See In re Adelaide Lillian Carrell, 7 F.C.C. 219, 222 (1939).
63. See In re Scroggin & Co. Bank, 1 F.C.C. 194, 196 (1935).
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that functional music services did constitute broadcasting under the
Communications Act.64 The court noted that the ability of some of the
listening audience to delete part of the signal did not necessarily render a
communication nonbroadcasting. 65 Furthermore, because the music was
popular with the free listening audience, the court was led to conclude
that the transmission was directed to, and intended to be received by, the
general public.66
Audience popularity, however, is not dispositive. In an era during
which the phrase "I want my MTV" has come to stand for instant grati-
fication as much as viewer loyalty, it is interesting to note that an MTV
devotee-or a loyalist of any particular channel-would not be permitted
to order a special television set that receives only a particular channel or
combination of channels. Despite the vehement opposition of the Con-
gressional minority who feared setting "a dangerous and far-reaching
precedent" by "substitut[ing] Government regulation for the public's
freedom to choose among manufactured products,"'67 every television set
sold in the United States must be capable of receiving all available
channels.68
64. Functional Music, 274 F.2d at 549.
65. Id. at 548.
66. Id.
67. S. REP. No. 1526, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 9 (1962), reprinted in 1962
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1873, 1880.
68. The Communications Act provides that the FCC shall:
Have authority to require that apparatus designed to receive television pictures
broadcast simultaneously with sound be capable of adequately receiving all frequen-
cies allocated by the Commission to television broadcasting when such apparatus is
shipped in interstate commerce; or is imported from any foreign country into the
United States, for sale or resale to the public.
47 U.S.C. § 303(s) (1988). Under this authority, the FCC created rules designed to minimize
the differences between VHF and UHF in reception, tuning mechanisms, channel readout,
picture sensitivity, and noise. See 47 C.F.R. § 15.117 (1990).
The Legislative History of § 303(s) states that this provision was passed to foster the
growth of noncommercial educational television. S. REP. No. 1526, supra note 67, at 3, re-
printed in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1874. At the time of the bill's enactment, the FCC had
allocated spectrum space to accommodate 1,544 UHF stations and 681 VHF stations. Of
these, 187 UHF stations and 92 VHF stations had been reserved for educational purposes, and
Congress, in considering further educational television legislation, had determined that an ad-
ditional 97 VHF stations and 821 UHF stations needed to be added. Id. at 2-3, reprinted in
1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1874-75. The problem was that, of the approximately 55 million televi-
sion sets in use, only nine million could receive UHF signals. This resulted in only seven
percent of the potential UHF stations actually being utilized. Id. The all-channel legislation
attempted to correct this problem.
Not surprisingly, this circumstance arose because RCA, one of broadcasting's major ser-
vice providers (as the parent of NBC), was also a major television manufacturer. See BER-
GREEN, supra note 1, at 6. In 1947, CBS was experimenting with color television broadcasting
which they expected to transmit on their assigned UHF frequencies. CBS, however, had no
manufacturing capability, and RCA, the owner of rival network NBC, began mass producing
black and white sets capable of receiving only VHF stations. RCA president, David Sarnoff,
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These cases exemplify how the FCC and the courts must balance
factors when adjudicating the validity of regulations covering new com-
munications technologies and services. They also demonstrate that, de-
spite the apparently innocuous nature of the Mitsubishi VCR,69 similar
inquiries are appropriate in this case.
Relevant policies about the preservation of established markets are
contained in section 605 of the Communications Act. This section, enti-
tled "Unauthorized publication or use of communications," 70 prohibits
reception and transmission of any interstate or foreign communication
by wire or radio and the divulgence of the existence, contents, effect, or
meaning of such communications, except through authorized channels of
reception. 71 The exceptions to this rule, however, are more relevant to
the present inquiry. These exceptions provide that:
The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the
interception or receipt by any individual, or the assisting (including the
manufacture or sale) of such interception or receipt, of any satellite
cable programming for private viewing if-
(1) the programming involved is not encrypted; and
(2)(A) a marketing system is not established under which (i) an agent
or agents have been lawfully designated for the purpose of authorizing
private viewing by individuals, and (ii) such authorization is available
to the individual involved from the appropriate agent or agents; or
(B) a marketing system described in subparagraph (A) is established
and the individual receiving such programming has obtained authori-
zation for private viewing under that system.72
The policy behind section 605(b), also known as the private viewing
exception, 73 is clear. The right of individuals to capture unencrypted sat-
ellite cable signals for their own use and enjoyment is subordinate to the
right of those with a proprietary interest in the signals to market those
signals for a profit.74 This provision represents an explicit congressional
weighing of competing interests. Since the FCC's mission is to regulate
correctly anticipated that the FCC would prefer to legitimize a system already in widespread
use rather than authorize a new system. Although it probably was not crucial to the success of
Sarnoff's plan to dominate the market, CBS' initial applications for color broadcasting were
denied in March 1947. In October 1947, FCC Chairman, Charles Denny, suddenly resigned
to take a job as vice president and general counsel of NBC. BERGREEN, supra note 1, at 140-
42.
69. See Sanger, supra note 7, at A18.
70. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1988).
71. Id. § 605(a).
72. Id. § 605(b).
73. Private viewing is defined as "the viewing for private use in an individual's dwelling
unit by means of equipment, owned or operated by such individual, capable of receiving satel-
lite cable programming directly from a satellite." Id. § 605(d)(4).
74. "[Slubsection [605](b)(2)(a) envisions the creation of a marketing system or other
marketplace mechanism whereby individuals can enjoy the private viewing of unencrypted
satellite cable programming if they receive authorization from those that have the proprietary
interest in that which is being intercepted or received." 130 CONG. REC. 31,874 (1984) (state-
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in the public interest 7 5 Congress must have believed that the mainte-
nance and distribution of viable, profit-making satellite cable signals bet-
ter served the public interest than permitting consumers to eliminate the
service provider in the middle by using technology such as commercial
avoidance.
Applying this provision to the context of an automatic commercial
avoidance feature, one may conclude that prohibiting its sale would not
be extraordinary. Because the thrust of section 605(b) is to preserve the
viability of commercial arrangements, a machine that allowed a portion
of the audience 76 to avoid "paying its way" 77 should come under
scrutiny.
This position is strengthened in the context of the Mitsubishi case if
the disabling transmissions by the Tokyo Broadcasting System are
viewed as a form of encryption. 78 A broadcaster's encryption of its signal
ment of Sen. Robert W. Packwood), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4742, 4747 [hereinafter
Statement of Sen. Robert W. Packwood].
75. See, eg., 47 U.S.C. §§ 157, 303.
76. Estimating the decline in ad viewership caused by automatic commercial avoidance
technology is important, both here and in the copyright discussion that follows. VCR owners
currently spend about an hour and a half a week, or three percent of their viewing time,
watching recorded programming. See supra note 19. The district court in Universal City
Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd in part, 659 F.2d 963
(9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), found that 82.4% of home recording occurred
while the viewer was gone or viewing another channel. Id. at 439. The court found it signifi-
cant that these viewers fast-forwarded through recorded commercials only 24.6% of the time.
Id. With automatic commercial avoidance, however, fast-forwarding through commercials
would not be an issue since the commercials would not appear on the tapes. Applying those
percentages to the numbers quoted above results in approximately 1.25 hours of absolutely
commercial-free viewing, or about 2.5% of the viewer's total television watching time. This
analysis assumes that everyone who already owns a conventional VCR would buy a second
VCR to obtain a machine with automatic commercial avoidance technology. Given the re-
sponse to the Mitsubishi VCR in Japan, see supra text accompanying note 9, this is not an
unreasonable assumption. Further, if home recording increases, as expected, due to the cur-
rent popularity of the Gemstar VCR Plus+, see Lublin, supra note 16, at B3, the destabiliza-
tion of the broadcast industry's economic arrangements is likely to increase.
77. See infra text accompanying note 108.
78. The Communications Act defines encryption as the transmission of satellite cable
programming "in a form whereby the aural and visual characteristics (or both) are modified or
altered for the purpose of preventing the unauthorized receipt of such programming by persons
without authorized equipment which is designed to eliminate the effects of such modification
or alteration." 47 U.S.C. § 605(d)(3) (1988) (emphasis added). "Authorized equipment"
would include a conventional descrambling kit that a paid cable system subscriber might re-
ceive. See Statement of Sen. Robert W. Packwood, supra note 74, at 4747. "Satellite cable
programming" is defined as "video programming which is transmitted via satellite and which
is primarily intended for the direct receipt by cable operators for their retransmission to cable
subscribers." 47 U.S.C. § 605(d)(1) (emphasis added).
No "private viewing" exists for encrypted programming. See Statement of Sen. Robert
W. Packwood, supra note 74, at 4749. The viewer must subscribe to the cable service to escape
the § 605(a) prohibition. The manufacture, distribution, and sale of devices used primarily for
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manifests its intention to assert dominion over that signal79 and a desire
not to have it tampered with or appropriated. 80 Thus, while the average
viewer naturally might feel some hostility toward a network's transmit-
ting distortion in response to the introduction of the commercial avoid-
ance feature, the situation is not significantly different than if the network
initially had transmitted such distortion as a prophylactic measure to
protect its signal.81 Arguably, requiring a broadcaster to cease such a
protective transmission and allow homeowners to avoid the commercials
that pay for the programs they watch would be tantamount to ordering a
subscription service such as HBO to descramble its signal so that signal
pirates can watch free movies. The Act prohibits the latter, and it should
prohibit the former.
IH. The Copyright Act
Contrary to what most individuals would expect, copyright, the
grant of a limited monopoly in the exploitation of a work, was first con-
ceived as a tool of censorship rather than as a stimulus to creativity.8 2
Through a series of fortunate metamorphoses, however, copyright has
come to serve the dissemination rather than censorship of ideas.8 3 The
United States Constitution empowers Congress: "to Promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
unauthorized decryption of satellite cable programming or commiting other violations of
§ 605(a) carry heavy penalties. 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4).
79. Alternatively, even if the signals are considered "wild," another broadcast prac-
tice may remove them from the concept offerae naturae This practice is scram-
bling, whereby the transmitter distorts the normal signal in such a way that the
normal television set cannot understand it. By scrambling a signal the sender has
arguably retained dominion and control because in theory, only those who have the
sender's permissibn may receive the intelligible signal. The "animal" is on a long
leash, still controlled by the owner.
Robert D. Haymer, Note, Who Owns the Air? Unscrambling the Satellite Viewing Rights Di-
lemma, 20 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 145, 152 (1986) (footnote omitted).
80. The Act acknowledges the noncommercial nature of Public Broadcasting System pro-
gramming and guarantees at least one source of unencrypted access to such programming.
No person shall encrypt or continue to encrypt satellite delivered programs included
in the National Program Service of the Public Broadcasting Service and intended for
public viewing by retransmission by television broadcast stations; except that as long
as at least one unencrypted satellite transmission of any program subject to this subsec-
tion is provided, this subsection shall not prohibit additional encrypted satellite trans-
missions of the same program.
47 U.S.C. § 605(c) (emphasis added).
81. Apart from the Communications Act, federal law also criminalizes the manufacture,
distribution, possession, and advertising of devices primarily useful for "surreptitious intercep-
tion of wire, oral or electronic communications." 18 U.S.C. § 2512 (1988). This has been
interpreted to apply to the unauthorized decryption of satellite cable programming. United
States v. McNutt, 908 F.2d 561, 564-65 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 111 S. Ct. 955 (1991).
82. ALAN LATMAN ET AL., COPYRIGHT FOR THE NiNETns (3d ed. 1989).
83. Id. at 1-12.
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thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."'8 4 The current United States copyright authority is the
Copyright Act of 1976.85
Chapter One of the Copyright Act defines the subject matter of
copyright,8 6 and the exclusive rights obtained through copyright.8 7 Vio-
lation of these rights constitutes copyright infringement.88 Chapter One
also enumerates several substantial limitations on those exclusive
rights.8 9
84. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This is the only mention of a "right" in the pre-Bill of
Rights Constitution. David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J.
COPYRIGr Soc'y. 421,421 (1983), reprinted in LATMAN ET AL., supra note 82, at 19. While
one may argue that "privileges and immunities" is largely synonymous with "rights," the
Copyright Clause is nonetheless unique in its enumeration of a specific right conferred by
Congress, rather than by the States. Courts generally have recognized that the limited monop-
oly granted to authors is a means to the greater public good and not an end in itself. See, eg.,
Twentieth Century Music v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). InAiken the Court noted: "The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor.
But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good." Id
85. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988).
86. Copyright protection subsists... in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
Id. § 102(a). "The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compila-
tions and derivative works, but protection for a work.., in which copyright subsists does not
extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully." Id § 103(a).
87. Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly.
Id. § 106.
88. Id. § 501.
89. See id. §§ 107-120.
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Two Copyright Act provisions that govern the limitations on exclu-
sive rights support the idea that the unauthorized elimination of adver-
tisements from a broadcast are not copyright violations. Section 111
permits certain secondary transmissions9° without compensation to the
copyright holder and, if certain conditions are met, permits secondary
transmissions by cable systems upon payment of a licensing fee.91 The
exemption for cable provides, however, that such a secondary transmis-
sion is actionable as an infringement:
[if] any commercial advertising or station announcements transmitted
by the primary transmitter ... is in any way wilfully altered by the
cable system through changes, deletions, or additions, except for the
alteration, deletion, or substitution of commercial advertisements per-
formed by those engaged in television commercial advertising market
research: Provided, That the research company has obtained the prior
consent of the advertiser who has purchased the original commercial
advertisement. 92
Section 111 similarly exempts from liability secondary transmissions by
"the management of a hotel, apartment house, or similar establishment
... to the private lodgings of guests or residents of such establishlment,
[where] no direct charge is made to see or hear the secondary transmis-
sion."' 93 The House Report states that the exemption "would not apply if
the secondary transmission consists of anything other than the mere re-
lay of ordinary broadcasts. The cutting out of advertising, the running in
of new commercials, or any other change in the signal relayed would
subject the secondary transmitter to full liability."'94
Section 119 of the Copyright Act exempts secondary transmissions
of superstation and network broadcasts by satellite carriers from liabil-
ity.95 This section also creates a cause of action for any secondary trans-
mission "if the content of the particular program... or any commercial
advertising or station announcement transmitted by the primary trans-
mitter... is in any way wilfully altered by the satellite carrier through
changes, deletions, or additions ... .-"96 Congress seemed to fear that a
secondary transmitter's systematic elimination of advertisements from a
primary broadcast would destabilize existing economic arrangements.
To the extent that a VCR with automatic commercial avoidance achieves
the same result, Congress and the courts should express similar concern.
90. A secondary transmission is "the further transmitting of a primary transmission si-
multaneously with the primary transmission or nonsimultaneously with the primary transmis-
sion." Id § 111(f).
91. Id. § 111(a)-(d).
92. I.d § 11 l(c)(3) (emphasis added).
93. Id. § 111(a)(1).
94. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5706 (emphasis added).
95. 17 U.S.C. § 119.
96. Id. § I19(a)(4) (emphasis added).
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Perhaps the most well known limitation on exclusive rights is the
Fair Use Doctrine. The Fair Use Doctrine is a judicially created doc-
trine designed to mitigate the harsh effects of copyright law under which
even minor copying can constitute an infringement. 97 The 1976 Act
codified the Fair Use Doctrine. Its key provisions state that:
The fair use of a copyrighted work.., for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching... scholarship, or research, is not
an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of
a work in any particular case is a fair use, the factors to be considered
shall include
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.98
The seminal case on fair use in the context of home taping is Univer-
sal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America.99 In that case, the court con-
sidered whether recording television programs on a VCR1°° for later
viewing constituted a copyright infringement or was protected as a fair
use.10 1 The plaintiff copyright holders, Universal and Walt Disney Pro-
97. See, eg., Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706, 713 (S.D.N.Y
1987) (stating that "[d]efendants argue that their poster could not infringe plaintiff's copyright
because only a small proportion of its design could possibly be considered similar. This argu-
ment is both factually and legally without merit."). For a summary of the Fair Use Doctrine's
development, see LATMAN ET AL., supra note 82, at 578-84; see also Universal City Studios v.
Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 443, 446-50 (C.D. Cal. 1979):
The language in § 106 [exclusive rights in copyrighted works] is general and broad.
It appears to apply to every situation involving reproduction of a copyrighted work.
It does not reflect the specific attention Congress gave to several types of reproduc-
tion. As the legislative history shows, Congress did not always draft statutory lan-
guage to reflect its intent.
Id. at 443.
98. 17 U.S.C. § 107. Congress intended § 107 to be a restatement of the judicially cre-
ated Fair Use Doctrine but did not intend to restrict the rule's equitable application:
The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use,
but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a
period of rapid technological change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of
what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to
adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis. Section 107 is
intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or
enlarge it in any way.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 94, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680.
99. 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
100. The court in Universal City Studios referred to the recorders as "VTRs" rather than
"VCRs." In the interests of consistency, the author uses "VCR" throughout.
101. Plaintiff copyright holders contended that home taping violated their right under 17
U.S.C. § 106(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords. Universal City
Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 443. "Copies" are defined in the Act as "material objects, other than
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ductions, sued VCR manufacturer Sony, several retailers, an advertiser,
and an individual VCR user, alleging both direct and contributory or
vicarious infringement, 0 2 and sought injunctive relief.103
The district court found against plaintiffs on all counts."' 4 Particu-
larly important for the present inquiry is the court's holding that non-
commercial home copying of material, broadcast free of charge,
constitutes a fair use.10 5 Before conducting the four-pronged fair use
analysis,10 6 the court declared that two distinguishing factors marked the
case: "(1) Home-use recording is done by individuals or families in the
privacy of their own home for use in their home. (2) The material copied
has been voluntarily sold by the authors for broadcast over the public
airwaves to private homesfree ofcharge." 0 7 The court characterized the
relationship between the viewer and copyright holder as follows:
[A]dvertisers typically pay the broadcasters a fee for each transmission
of an advertisement based on an estimate of the expected number and
characteristics of the viewers who will watch the program. While, as
members of the general public, the viewers indirectly pay for the privi-
lege of viewing copyrighted material through increased prices for the
goods and services of the advertisers, they are not involved in a direct
economic relationship with the copyright holders or their licensees.108
This characterization of the viewer's financial "obligation" to the copy-
right holder as one that is satisfied at the grocery store rather than in
front of the TV weighed heavily in the court's analysis of the harm or
financial injury to the copyright holder. 1°9 "Because plaintiffs derive
their revenues orly indirectly from the alleged infringers of their work,
the harm resulting from the infringement is more speculative."' 10
phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either di-
rectly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 101. Videotapes of copyrighted
material constitute "copies" as defined in the Act.
102. A person is guilty of contributory infringement if he, "with knowledge of the infring-
ing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another."
Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 459 (quoting Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia
Artists Management, 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted)). Vicarious liabil-
ity derives from tort principles of respondeat superior. It can, however, be imposed irrespec-
tive of an employer-employee relationship when a party has the "right and ability to supervise
the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities." Id. at 461
(quoting Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162).
103. Id. at 463. All damage claims against the individual VCR user were waived. Id. at
436-37.
104. Id. at 469.
105. Id. at 442-56.
106. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
107. Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 450 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 453 (quoting Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 415 U.S. 394,
411-12 (1974)) (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. Id. Interestingly, the court was skeptical that the Betamax machine, which at the
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The plaintiffs admitted that actual harm to their copyrights had yet
to occur."1 Indeed, the court noted that plaintiffs' profits had actually
increased during the years VCR technology grew.' 1 2 Moreover, the
court held that plaintiffs' claim that unrestrained home copying would
have an "imminent effect" on their copyrights" 3 did not constitute the
"irreparable injury" necessary to support an injunction." 4 As to the spe-
cific issue of harm caused by commercial avoidance, the court stated:
It must be remembered, however, that to omit commercials, Betamax
owners must view the program, including the commercials, while re-
cording. To avoid commercials during playback, the viewer must fast-
forward and, for the most part, guess as to when the commercial has
passed. For most recordings, either practice may be too tedious. As
defendants' survey showed, 92 percent of the programs were recorded
with commercials and only 25% of the owners fast-forward through
them. Advertisers will have to make the same kinds of judgments they
do now about whether persons viewing televised programs actually
watch the advertisements which interrupt them.
115
The court acknowledged that home taping would "undoubtedly change
the industry and introduce new considerations into plaintiffs' marketing
considerations," but concluded that copyright law does not protect au-
thors from such effects."16 The court further reasoned that if plaintiffs
suffer indirect losses from lost ratings and lost advertising, "plaintiffs
have marketing alternatives at hand to recoup some of that predicted
lOSS."117
time cost approximately $875.00, with tapes running $20.00 per cassette, would proliferate
among the nation's 75 million television households so as to injure the plaintiffs. Id. at 451.
As noted above, seven out of ten households now have VCRs and over 80 million VCRs have
been sold. See supra text accompanying note 16.
111. Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 451.
112. Id. at 452.
113. The "imminent effect" alleged by the plaintiffs was that such unrestrained copying
would lead to- a loss of revenue due to such practices as "librarying" tapes for repeated view-
ing; a diminution of the market for reruns; and the fast forwarding and deletion of commer-
cials. Id. at 467-68.
114. Id. at 463-69. The court indicated that even had it found home taping to constitute
copyright infringement, it would not have enjoined the manufacture and sale of VCRs. Id. at
464. To do so, the court stated, would deprive the public of a new technology capable of
noninfringing uses where the threat of irreparable injury was by no means clear. Id.
115. Id. at 468.
116. Id. at 444. "While securing compensation to the holders of copyright was an essen-
tial purpose of [the Copyright] Act, freezing existing economic arrangements for doing so was
not." Id. at 452 (quoting Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 415 U.S. 394,
414 n.15 (1974)).
117. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40 for examples of marketing alternatives
currently being employed by advertisers.
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The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that home
taping for time shifting purposes was not a fair use."1 " Rather than set-
ting aside the district court's findings of fact, the court of appeals chal-
lenged the district court's application and understanding of the Fair Use
Doctrine. The court stated that the Fair Use Doctrine properly applies
only to those "productive uses" that are listed in the first part of the fair
use statute. 119 It also stated that the use of the copyrighted material for
its intrinsic purpose 120 generally had been held not to constitute fair
use.121 The court found it significant that the statute did not list "con-
venience," "entertainment," or "increased access" as purposes within the
general scope of fair use.122
The court of appeals then balanced the four statutory fair use factors
and concluded that this did not alter its finding against fair use.123 In
conducting its analysis, the court criticized the preeminence the district
court gave to the issue of harm.124 As to the specific issue of harm, the
court of appeals believed that the district court had based its decision
largely on plaintiffs' failure to prove actual harm-a burden "[t]hat is
simply too great... to impose on copyright plaintiffs." 125 Rather, the
district court should have considered whether "the infringing work tends
to diminish or prejudice the potential sale of plaintiff's work."'126 Under
this standard, plaintiffs would have prevailed because home taping con-
stitutes a complete intrinsic use of the copyrighted work.127
The United States Supreme Court, in reversing the court of ap-
peals,128 rejected the lower court's rigid "productive use" test and held
118. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d. 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd,
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
119. Id at 970-72. The fair use statute is discussed supra at text accompanying notes 97-
98.
120. "Fair use has not heretofore had to do with mere reproduction of a work in order to
use it for its intrinsic purpose-to make what might be called the 'ordinary' use of it." Id at
970 (quoting LEON SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 24 (1978)). Thus,
for example, reproducing a book so that someone else could read it would be reproducing the
book for its intrinsic purpose.
121. Universal City Studios, 659 F.2d at 970-72.
122. Id at 970.
123. Id at 972-74.
124. The mere absence of competition or injurious effect upon the copyrighted work
will not make a use fair. The right of a copyright proprietor to exclude others is
absolute and if it has been violated the fact that the infringement will not affect the
sale or exploitation of the work or pecuniarily damage him is immaterial.
Id. at 973 (quoting Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165, 184 (S.D.
Cal. 1955)). Harm is defined as "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1976).
125. Universal City Studios 659 F.2d at 974.
126. Id. (quoting 3 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.05(E)(4)(c), at 13-84 (1981)).
127. Id.
128. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Amici briefs
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that "Congress has plainly instructed us that fair use analysis calls for a
sensitive balancing of interests. The distinction between 'productive' and
'unproductive' uses may be helpful in calibrating the balance, but it can-
not be wholly determinative."' 129 The Court returned to the district
court's fair use analysis and focused on the issue of harm. The Court
held that a showing of actual present harm is not required. Rather, the
plaintiff must show that "some meaningful likelihood of future harm ex-
ists. If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be
presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must
be demonstrated." 130 The Court upheld the district court's findings on
the issues of actual and prospective harm and reinstated that court's
verdict.131
Following the Supreme Court's direction in Universal City Studios, a
fair use analysis of VCRs with automatic commercial avoidance technol-
ogy must focus upon the question of harm.132 Under the district court's
urging affirmance were filed by: the Association of American Publishers, Inc.; CBS, Inc.; Cre-
ators and Distributors of Programs; the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees
and Moving Picture Machine Operators of the United States and Canada; AFL-CIO; the Na-
tional Music Publishers' Association, Inc.; Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, Inc.; and the Writ-
ers Guild of America West, Inc. Amici briefs urging reversal of the court of appeals' decision
were filed by: the Virginia Citizens' Consumer Counsel; the American Library Association;
the Consumer Electronics Group; the Educators Ad Hoc Committee on Copyright Law; Gen-
eral Electric Co.; Hitachi, Ltd.; McCann-Erickson, Inc.; Minnesota Mining and Manufactur-
ing Co.; the National Retail Merchants Association; Sanyo Electric, Inc.; Sears, Roebuck and
Co.; TDK Electronics Co., Ltd.; Toshiba Corp.; and Viare Publishing. Clearly, there are sub-
stantial economic interests on both sides of this issue.
The attorneys general of Missouri and several other states filed a brief urging the grant of
certiorari, but took a noneconomic position:
America is television oriented; Missourians, like their counterparts in the other 49
states, are television oriented. Television is no longer a luxury; it has become a neces-
sity. Missouri's citizens rely upon this widely-accepted technological phenomenon
not only for entertainment, but also for education, cultural enrichment and news.
Television has become more than a source of these; it plays a role in shaping our
society. Its broadcasts allow us to experience history, form the substance of coffee-
klatch conversation .... and provide instant commonality between strangers. Acces-
sibility to the full range of television programming is an essential component of the
well-rounded citizen. Videotaping enhances accessibility to television programming;
the use of videotape recorders contributes to the public welfare.
Brief for the States of Missouri, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Louisi-
ana, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont, Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin in Support of Petition for Certiorari at 3, Universal City Studios, 464 U.S.
417 (1984) (No. 81-1687).
129. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40. It has been suggested, however, that this
reading of § 107 renders the first part of the section, which envisioned noninfringing uses "for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship or research," mere surplusage. LATMAN ET AL., supra note 82, at
583.
130. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. at 451.
131. Id. at 451-56.
132. Adding commercial avoidance technology to a conventional VCR should not affect
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analysis, 2.5% of television viewing would become "commercial free"
upon introduction of automatic commercial avoidance.1 33 The attendant
drop in advertising revenue arguably would cause concern among copy-
right holders.134 As discussed above, these losses would likely increase
with the popularity of technology that makes it simpler to program the
VCR to record off the air.135 When one also considers the popularity of
the VCR in the United States, it becomes apparent that a court ruling on
the legality of automatic commercial avoidance would be confronted
with a higher level of harm than was presented in the Sony case. While
the law cannot shield copyright holders from technological change, 136 it
should not leave them entirely unprotected. Due to the widespread pop-
ularity of VCRs, the increase in harm should be a significant factor in the
court's Fair Use Doctrine balancing and could result in a finding of in-
fringement for copyright holders.
This outcome is supported by further distinctions between the auto-
matic commercial avoidance case and the Universal City Studios case. In
discussing whether the VCR is capable of substantial noninfringing uses
for contributory infringement purposes, the Supreme Court in Universal
City Studios emphasized that plaintiffs' copyrights comprised well below
ten percent of current programming,13 7 and that numerous educational,
religious, and sports broadcasters testified that they did not object to
home taping. 138 The Court accepted the district court's findings that re-
cording a program for subsequent viewing "may enlarge the total view-
ing audience and that many producers are willing to allow private time-
shifting to continue, at least for an experimental time period." 139 While
the Supreme Court acknowledged that "[t]hird party conduct would be
wholly irrelevant in an action for direct infringement of respondents'
copyrights," 140 it appears that the above findings regarding nonaggrieved
copyright holders did influence its fair use analysis and its conclusion
that home taping did not constitute direct infringement. After reviewing
the fair use analysis under the first three statutory factors. The only difference between VCRs
with automatic commercial avoidance and the conventional VCRs discussed in the Universal
City Studios case is in the degree of certainty that commercials ultimately are not viewed. A
special inquiry into the first three statutory fair use factors is therefore unnecessary.
133. See supra note 76 for an estimation of the potential decline in commercial viewership
that would result from the introduction of VCRs with automatic commercial avoidance.
134. Despite fears about the recession, television advertising is flourishing. For the fall
1990 television season, network TV advertising expenditures were expected to grow by 8% and
cable TV advertising expenditures were expected to grow by 11%. Linda Molnar, The Shifting
Ad Dollar, Bus. J. N.J., May 1990, at 79.
135. See supra note 19.
136. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
137. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 443 (1984).
138. Id. at 446.
139. Id. at 443.
140. Id. at 446 (emphasis added).
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the district court's findings on plaintiffs' several claims of harm, the
Supreme Court stated:
The District Court's conclusions are buttressed by the fact that to the
extent time-shifting expands public access to freely broadcast television
programs, it yields societal benefits. [We previously have] acknowl-
edged the public interest in making television broadcasting more avail-
able. Concededly, that interest is not unlimited. But it supports an
interpretation of the concept of "fair use" that requires the copyright
holder to demonstrate some likelihood of harm before he may con-
demn a private act of time-shifting as a violation of federal law.141
In contrast, even though marketing VCRs with automatic commer-
cial avoidance would increase the potential for harm to the copyright
holder from the decrease in advertisement viewership and resulting loss
in revenue,142 it would not serve the policy of expanding access to broad-
cast TV any better than conventional VCRs currently do. The concept
of expanding access to copyrighted materials must be distinguished from
the existence of a market for automatic commercial avoidance. Argua-
bly, people might be more inclined to record off the air if they knew they
could watch the broadcast without having to zap through commercials.
It seems, however, that the Supreme Court's use of "expanding access"
refers to overcoming access barriers that are imposed upon the viewer
from without, such as a work schedule or the fact that two favorite pro-
grams run concurrently. To the extent that the Gemstar VCR Plus+
assists viewers in overcoming a technological barrier, its use would con-
stitute an expansion of access. By contrast, barriers that are personal to
the viewer, such as dislike of commercials, arguably do restrain access.
There are several other distinctions between Universal Studios and
the automatic commercial avoidance case. For example, although one
unspoken rationale behind the Supreme Court's decision was the Court's
unwillingness to see an entire industry dismantled, 143 no such concerns
are present here. Banning VCRs with automatic commercial avoidance
would leave the underlying conventional VCR industry unaffected. Ad-
ditionally, it is conceivable that at least the major sports leagues who
testified in support of time-shifting would feel differently about automatic
commercial avoidance. For example, advertising rates for the 1991
Super Bowl were $800,000 per thirty second spot. 44 Further, a court
considering the narrow issue of the harm caused by automatic commer-
cial avoidance might give less weight to the opinion of copyright holders
141. Id. at 454 (citing Community Television v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498, 508 n.12 (1983))
(emphasis added).
142. See supra note 76 and text accompanying note 133-34.
143. See supra note 128 for an extensive list of amicus briefs filed on both sides of the
litigation.
144. Kim Foltz, The Game, A Nail-Biter; The Ads, Well..., N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 29, 1991,
at D19.
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such as religious and educational broadcasters whose programs are often
shown on noncommercial TV.
Finally, the District Court's conclusion regarding the viewer's obli-
gations to the copyright holder must be addressed. That court stated
that the viewer's obligations are satisfied by paying more at the store for
advertised goods and services.145 The Copyright Act's policy of ensuring
a fair return to the copyright holder, however, is not an end in itself. The
ultimate goal of the Act is encouraging creativity for the general public
good.146 As with many statutory schemes, the Copyright Act achieves
its stated policies through engendering stability and predictability. 147 It
therefore violates neither the letter nor the spirit of the Copyright Act to
suggest that a viewer who acknowledges the benefit of a stable program-
ming system owes that system a degree of predictability in return. In-
deed by virtue of its participation in the Nielsen surveys, the viewing
public is already accustomed to actively cooperating with the broadcast-
ing industry's efforts to estimate and predict viewing patterns. Such co-
operation may require the viewer to keep a diary of his viewing habits
and even to push a button whenever he leaves a room where a television
is on.148
This is not to suggest that the maintenance of ratings services is
compelled by copyright law. It also does not suggest that viewers must
dutifully view all commercials. Nonetheless, given that the fair use anal-
ysis stemming from the Universal City Studios case focuses on shades of
harm to the copyright holder, the fact that one type of VCR was found
not to violate the Copyright Act does not mean that a VCR with ex-
panded capacity for harm must yield the same result. A line may exist
beyond which sacrificing the viewer's absolute autonomy in order to pre-
serve stability in the broadcasting industry serves the public good and
effectuates the underlying policies of the Copyright Act. A VCR that
mechanically, automatically, and infallibly ensures that commercials are
not viewed may be beyond the line.
145. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
146. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). "'The sole in-
terest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly' this Court has
said, 'lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.'" Id. (quot-
ing Fox Film Corp. V. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
147. See, eg., 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (1988) (prescribing three schemes for determining the
duration of copyright depending on the date of authorship); 17 U.S.C.A. § 111 (d) (West Supp.
1991) (establishing a detailed compulsory licensing scheme for secondary retransmissions by
cable systems, and thus injecting an element of certainty by removing the need for individual
negotiation).
148. See Bickelhaupt, supra note 27, at 53.
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IV. The Search for Private Rights
The Communications Act provisions on signal interception presup-
pose that there is a property right in signals, and that this right of control
is most efficiently allocated to the broadcaster who sells the signal. 149 It
is, however, less clear whether the same conclusion can be drawn with
respect to rights in a "free" TV broadcast signal or a signal for which the
viewer has paid.
Dicta in two Supreme Court copyright cases suggests that the court
might recognize a viewer's right to control of the freely broadcast signal.
In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 150 the Court noted that:
Members of the public, by means of television sets and antennas that
they themselves provide, receive the broadcaster's signals and reconvert
them into the visible images and audible sounds of the program. The
effective range of the broadcast is determined by the combined contri-
bution of the equipment employed by the broadcaster and that sup-
plied by the viewer. 151
In Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 152 the Court stated that once a television
program has been broadcast, it has been "released to the public,"'1 53 and
the broadcaster and copyright owner have "no control over the segment
of the population which may view the program."'154 It further stated that
"[t]he privilege of receiving the broadcast electronic signals and of con-
verting them into the sights and sounds of the program inheres in all
members of the public who have the means of doing so.'1 55 This language
suggests that once the broadcaster releases his signal into the air, the
viewer in possession of the necessary technology has an unqualified right
to select which of those signals he will receive into his home and by im-
plication, which he will not.
Fortnightly and Teleprompter dealt with the issue of whether certain
secondary transmissions constituted public performances and, thus, were
infringements of copyright. 156 While the Court held that the transmis-
sions did not constitute public performances, the Copyright Act of 1976
expressly overruled those holdings, effecting a limitation on a signal re-
149. For a thorough discussion of signal transmission as a classical property right, see
Haymer, supra note 79, at 147-54.
150. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
151. Id. at 397-98 (emphasis added).
152. 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
153. Id. at 409-10.
154. Id. at 412.
155. Id. at 408 (emphasis added).
156. Teleprompter Corp., 415 U.S. at 406-15; Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 395-402. "Sub-
ject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright... has the exclusive rights...: (4) in
the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,... and other audiovisual
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly." 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(4) (West Supp. 1991).
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ceiver's rights respecting broadcast signals. 157 To the extent that Fort-
nightly and Teleprompter have been overruled, the dicta expressed above
is severely, if not fatally, weakened.
The "first sale" doctrine in section 109 of the Copyright Act,158
though not technically applicable, may offer a jurisprudential source of
viewer rights. The first sale doctrine provides: "Notwithstanding the
provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or pho-
norecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by
such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to
sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or pho-
norecord."' 159 Though technically only applicable to copies and pho-
norecords, the first sale doctrine can be analogously applied to broadcast
signals.160 Thus, a home viewer receiving a program in the form of a
broadcaster's transmission-the "copy"--could "dispose" of that signal
157. To perform or display a work 'publicly' means -
2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a
place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process ....
To 'transmit' a performance or display is to communicate it by any device or process
whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
According to the House Report:
The definition of 'transmit' ... is broad enough to include all conceivable forms and
combinations of wired or wireless communications media, including but by no means
limited to radio and television broadcasting as we know them. Each and every
method by which the images or sounds comprising a performance or display are
picked up and conveyed is a 'transmission,' and ifthe transmission reaches the public
in [any] form, the case comes within the scope of ... section 106.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 94, at 64, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5678.
158. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1988).
159. Id. Section 106(3) grants the copyright holder the exclusive right "to distribute cop-
ies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of owner-
ship, or by rental, lease, or lending." Id. § 106(3) (1988).
160. Since the "first sale" doctrine only applies to "copies," the doctrine arguably is not
applicable to broadcast signals. The Copyright Act defines "copies" as "material objects, other
than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed,
and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device." Id. § 101 (emphasis added). It can be argued
both that the pictures or signals received by the viewer are not sufficiently "fixed" so as to
constitute a copy, and also that they are not material objects.
The Act provides that:
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy
or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory durations. A work consisting of sounds, images, or
both, that are being transmitted, is "fixed" for purposes of this title if a fixation of the
work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.
Id. (emphasis added). Such simultaneous fixation must, as the statute indicates, be made
"under the authority of the author." The relevant "copy" that results in copyright protection
being accorded to the broadcast is made by the broadcaster at its end and not the viewer. This
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in any manner, including the automatic deletion of commercial
advertisements.
One question, however, immediately arises: When does the viewer's
claim to ownership mature? One obvious answer is upon payment. With
"free" TV, the viewer pays, if at all, by viewing commercials, or by per-
mitting the commercial to enter his home and providing broadcasters
and advertisers a predictable basis for determining who is paying for the
programming. 61 Thus, because a VCR with automatic commercial
avoidance would automatically delete commercials, it would effectively
prevent the absent viewer from acquiring ownership under the first sale
doctrine. While there is little practical difference between recording a
program with a VCR that automatically deletes commercials and manu-
ally deleting the commercials as one records, it must be recalled that the
majority of home taping occurs with no one present.162 Thus, the owner
of a VCR with automatic commercial avoidance would not acquire own-
ership of the broadcast signal, and the first sale doctrine would not apply.
The situation is slightly different when a home viewer has lawfully
subscribed to a cable system that transmits programming containing ad-
vertisements. The question arises: What exactly has the viewer bought?
One theory suggests that the cable company has merely brokered a trans-
action between the viewer and the primary broadcaster. Thus, the viewer
with an automatic commercial avoidance VCR would acquire whatever
rights were appropriate under a Universal City Studios fair use analy-
sis.163 On the other hand, if the viewer is characterized as making his
purchase from the cable company, a different result obtains. The cable
company can only sell the rights it possesses. 64 Since section 111 of the
Copyright Act prohibits a cable company's deletion of commercials from
the primary transmission,1 65 the company does not own the right to com-
implies that the viewer does not obtain ownership of a "copy" for first sale purposes. Indeed,
no such suggestion was made in any of the Universal City Studios opinions.
It is nonetheless arguable that theprinciples behind the first sale doctrine can be applied to
this Note to illuminate the discussion of a viewer's obligation to the copyright holder.
161. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text, text accompanying notes 108-09 for
discussion of the viewer's "duties" respecting commercials.
162. See supra note 101.
163. See supra notes 99-142 and accompanying text.
164. See, eg., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1976)
(liability for infringement found where licensee conveyed greater editorial rights than were
conveyed in original license). In Gilliam the court noted:
If the broadcast of an edited version of the Monty Python program infringed the
group's copyright in the script, ABC may obtain no solace from the fact that editing
was permitted in the agreements between BBC [the original licensee] and Time-Life
or Time-Life and ABC.... Since a grantor may not convey greater rights than it
owns, BBC's permission to allow Time-Life, and hence ABC, to edit appears to have
been a nullity.
Id. at 21.
165. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
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mercial-free programming and cannot convey the right to commercial-
free programming to the viewer. Thus, the transactional basis for imput-
ing viewer ownership of the signal to invoke the first sale doctrine must
fail.
Occasionally, however, a case that runs counter to the Copyright
Act's market maximization policies slips through. In Vault Corp. v.
Quaid Software Ltd.,166 the plaintiff marketed a diskette on which
software programs could be placed. The diskette contained a "finger-
print" that instructed the computer not to run the software program un-
less it recognized the fingerprint. 167 Thus, while unauthorized copies of
software programs could be made, they could not be run in a computer
unless that computer recognized the fingerprint. 168 Defendants utilized
plaintiff's diskette to produce a program capable of defeating the an-
ticopying protection marketed by plaintiff.169
The court of appeals upheld the district court in holding that de-
fendants neither directly nor contributorily infringed plaintiff's copy-
right.1 70 Despite citing a survey which stated that "the loss of income to
software manufacturers resulting from unauthorized copies was approxi-
mately $1.3 billion from 1981 to 1984, $800 million in 1985, and $800
million in 1986,"'171 the court held that defendant's program was capable
of substantial noninfringing uses.172 The court justified its holding by
citing the provision of the Copyright Act which provides that: "[Ilt is
not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to
make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that com-
puter program provided: ... (2) that such new copy or adaptation is for
archival purposes only."'173 Though defendant's product was neither
designed nor marketed for such purpose, it did facilitate the making of
archival copies and, thus, was not an infringement. 74 This rationale,
however, cannot be used to validate commercial avoidance. As discussed
earlier, automatic commercial avoidance technology does not facilitate
the use of the underlying "program" in any meaningful way, such as by
expanding viewer access,175 and its use is not otherwise supported within
the text of the Copyright Act. The aberrational result of Vault-the vali-
dation of a device known to disrupt economic relationships and cause
166. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
167. Id at 256.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 257.
170. Id. at 261-67.
171. Id. at 261 n.13.
172. Id at 263-67.
173. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988). Archival purposes refers to the creation of a program's back-
up copy to be utilized only when the original program is damaged or destroyed.
174. Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 266-67.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 135-40.
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significant revenue loss-should be limited to its particular facts and
should not be used to support any overarching jurisprudential support
for commercial avoidance technology. 176
Conclusion
Not every innovation or convenience is good. Nor can all conduct
deemed an expression of our freedom be defended. 177 Even when dealing
with the relatively innocuous area of home entertainment, interests must
be balanced and hard choices must be made.178 With due regard for the
common wisdom that commercials are barely deserving of our attention,
much less the protection of our legal system, current law supports the
prohibition of VCRs with automatic commercial avoidance technology
for several reasons.
First, the technology would contravene significant Federal Commu-
nications Act policies that favor the stabilization of industry marketing
arrangements over the individual's rights to capture and utilize broadcast
signals. 179 Second, the increased loss of advertising revenue to copyright
holders caused by VCRs with automatic commercial avoidance technol-
ogy could be significant enough to be beyond the scope of the Fair Use
Doctrine.180 Finally, automatic commercial avoidance technology just
"ain't" fair play; it is having your cake and eating it too.
While a court adjudicating a copyright case about a VCR with auto-
matic commercial avoidance would have adequate grounds to hold that
176. A complete inquiry into the justifications that may permit citizens to possess other
arguably antisocial devices, such as police scanners and radar detectors, is beyond the scope of
this Note. As one judge noted: "Since Congress passed a 1975 law that has had the effect of
creating a nationwide fifty-five miles per hour maximum speed limit, . . . it appears that an
entire industry has sprung up to assist Americans, ever vigilant of their 'freedom,' in being able
to evade the law with relative impunity." Cincinnati Microwave v. Larricek's Inc., No. 83 C
3352, slip op. at I n.1 (N.D. IIl. Aug. 9, 1983). While state bans on radar have been held
constitutional, see, eg., Electrolert Corp. v. Barry, 737 F.2d 110 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Bryant
Radio Supply v. Slane, 507 F. Supp. 1325 (W.D. Va. 1981), aff'd, 669 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1982),
to date only Connecticut, Virginia, and the District of Columbia have taken such steps. See
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-137 (West 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1079 (Michie 1989);
D.C. Pol. Reg., Art. 25, § 16 (1981). For a discussion of Congressional power in this area, see
Nikolaus F. Schandlbauer, Note, Busting the Fuzzbuster: Rethinking Bans on Radar Detectors,
94 DICK. L. Rv. 783 (1990). The FCC has taken the position that, though it regulates police
radar, regulation of radar detectors is not within its mandate because such devices do not
transmit. F.C.C. Federal Communications Bulletin, July 18, 1980, cited in Michele M. Fields
& Andrew R. Hricko, Prohibiting Radar Detectors: Legal Issues, 37 FED. INS. CORP. COUNS.
Q. 317, 318-19, 320 n.10 (1988).
177. As Justice Holmes noted, "The most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
178. See supra note 6.
179. See supra notes 46-81 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 97-146 and accompanying text.
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use of such a machine does not constitute a fair use and should thus be
enjoined, the more efficient course of action would be for Congress or the
FCC to pass laws or regulations barring their manufacture and sale.
Such legislative action should be taken now, before substantial money is
expended on research and development,181 and certainly before such ma-
chines are introduced and the advertising industry mounts its counterat-
tack. 1 2 In so proceeding, the law will have taken the unusual step of
solving a problem prospectively, and the home viewer, in his battle
against the spreading cancer of advertising, will be spared a cure that
would surely prove worse than the disease.
181. See supra note 128 for a list of major companies and organizations that filed amicus
briefs on both sides of the Universal City Studios litigation. As noted previously, one possible
unspoken rationale behind Universal City Studios is that the Supreme Court did not want to
see a growing industry cut off in the bloom of youth.
182. For a list of recent nightmarish advertising innovations, see supra notes 37-45 and
accompanying text.
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